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Theory predicts that under certain restrictions on preferences prudent consumers
will allocate relatively more funds to riskless assets when there is uninsurable back-
ground risk. This paper analyzes empirically the relevance of precautionary motives
for the structure of household wealth. To this end, a new and rich data source from
the Netherlands is exploited. The question of primary concern is: what impact,
if any, does the presence of income uncertainty have on the structure of Dutch
households' portfolios? We employ various semi{parametric estimators, both for
cross{sections and for panel data to assess the response of households' portfolios
to uninsurable background risk. We nd some, but not unanimous support for the
view that portfolios become less risky as income uncertainty increases.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of income uncertainty and precautionary motives on the
structure of households' portfolios. The theory of precautionary savings (Leland (1968)
and Kimball (1990)) suggests that, given certain properties of the underlying preference
structure, individuals facing uninsurable background risk will accumulate additional re-
sources to buer adverse income shocks. Not only the level of wealth accumulation will
be aected, but the additionally generated savings will be channeled into certain assets:
households will allocate a larger share to riskless or liquid assets (Kimball (1992, 1993))
while the demand for risky assets will decrease as background risk increases (Koo (1991)
and Bertaut and Haliassos (1992)).
This topic is important since it deals with responses to uninsurable risks, ie. risks
which due to incompleteness of insurance markets cannot be shared among agents. One
might argue (as Allen and Gale (1994) in their introduction) that even though nancial
innovations help to remove incompletenesses in nancial markets, the importance of unin-
surable earnings risk is increasing because employment relations become less stable over
time. Then, handling of earnings risk becomes more important. To better understand how
portfolio risks in the presence of unrelated risks are allocated in nancial markets, a rst
step is to investigate the portfolio response of individual households to this type of risk,
which we assume to be uninsurable. The current paper investigates whether empirical
evidence can be found to support the theoretical predictions.
We study Dutch panel data. The Netherlands are an interesting case for studying
precautionary saving because the country's national saving rate (14%, 1988) is quite
high in international comparison, while at the same time mortgage constraints like down
payment requirements are absent (Hochguertel and Van Soest (1996)). Thus, prima facie,
liquidity constraints would presumably not play an as important role to explain saving
as they do in other countries. Another piece of prima facie evidence is that around three
quarters of interviewed respondents in our data would assign a value of 5{7 on a 7{point
scale to the statement: Is it to you personally of much [7] or little [1] importance: Saving
\as a reserve to cover unforeseen expenses". Since most non{housing wealth of Dutch
households is held in saving related assets, and the household stock{ownership rate in the
Netherlands is one of the lowest among advanced economies (Hochguertel et al. (1997)),
this raises the question whether earnings uncertainty induces households to hold more
riskless assets, provided there is a precautionary motive.
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on estimating the demand for riskless
assets in the form of a budget share equation. We use a new survey on Dutch households
(VSB panel), which was specically targeted at the wealth structure and savings behavior
of households and thus provides an excellent basis to address wealth and savings related
questions. The survey constitutes a rich source of household wealth information and also2
comprises measures of individual attitudes to saving and income expectations. Sever-
al possible choices for an operational measure of income uncertainty and precautionary
motives from the expectations data are discussed.
Some emphasis is put on simple models which are estimated with robust methods.
This point is important since theory does not yield closed form solutions for the equa-
tions to be estimated. For cross{section data we use both parametric models and Powell's
(1986a) censored regression quantile estimator; the latter is distribution free and robust
to unknown forms of heteroskedasticity. Especially the dierences across quantiles prove
to be of interest. Additionally, we exploit the panel nature of the data, applying Honor e's
(1992) semiparametric Tobit estimator for xed individual eects. These xed eects
represent time{invariant unobserved preference heterogeneity, for example. Incorporation
of xed eects has been missing so far in the empirical analysis of the impact of pre-
cautionary motives on household portfolio choice. We apply the selected semiparametric
estimator to both balanced and unbalanced panel data.
We explore the robustness of the ndings by extensive scrutiny with respect to model
specication. The analysis reveals that there is some, but not unanimous, support for the
view that income uncertainty increases the share allocated to riskless assets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the subsequent section we spec-
ify more precisely the implications for portfolio decisions in the presence of background
risk, and provide a brief overview of some related papers. The third section gives a de-
scription of the data and discusses measures of income uncertainty and precautionary
motives. Section four outlines the econometric models we consider, section ve discusses
the ndings. The nal section concludes.
2 Theoretical Implications & Empirical Findings
2.1 Precautionary Motives and Portfolio Choice
Leland (1968) was the rst to point out a motive for precautionary saving when the uti-
lity function exhibits convex marginal utility. Kimball (1990) introduced the notion of
prudence in analogy to the Arrow{Pratt measure of (absolute) risk aversion and showed
that the negative of marginal utility plays the same role for precautionary saving as the
utility function for risk aversion: concavity of the utility function U(U00 < 0) implies risk
aversion, concavity of −U0(U000 > 0) implies prudence. Kimball proposes to measure the
degree of prudence as  = −U000=U00 which indicates the strength of the precautionary
saving motive. In the presence of background risk, decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA) together with positive prudence imply positive precautionary savings. Kimball
also introduces the concept of a precautionary premium which is the amount of money that
must be given to a risk averse consumer to compensate her for unchanged behavior as the3
uncertainty of the environmentis changed. He shows, that under DARA the precautionary
premium exceeds the risk premium, meaning that the precautionary motive is stronger
than risk aversion. This had previously been established by Dr eze and Modigliani (1972).
Kimball (1992) shows in a two{period model that a risk which is compensated such that
expected utility stays the same, will still raise saving since it increases the second{period
marginal utility. An implication is that higher savings make it more desirable to take
on compensated risks. On the other hand, this complementarity between savings and
compensated risks implies that a compensated risk makes saving more attractive as well.
All that is said so far just means that prudent consumers cope with risks (which are
otherwise uninsurable) by accumulating more life{time resources than they otherwise
would.
But the question remains: what determines how the additional funds are allocated
across assets? Kimball (1993) claries the implication of prudence for asset demand.
He shows that \standard risk aversion" (dened as global decreasing absolute prudence
(DAP), or local DAP with DARA) is sucientto decrease the level of investmentin a risky
asset in the presence of an independent zero{mean background wealth. Kimball (1992)
introduces the term \temperance" (often measured as  = −U0000=U000) which describes a
desire to reduce total exposure to risk. This involves that in the presence of one risk, the
decision maker tries to avoid other risks. Thus, there is a negative interaction between
those risks, if they are statistically independent. The implication for a portfolio choice
problem is that temperance induces individual investors to allocate relatively more funds
to riskless assets. Under standardness, temperance is greater than prudence, which in
turn is greater than risk aversion, which is positive (    >0). Prudence leads to
more precautionary savings, while temperance induces the investor to allocate relatively
more to riskless assets, it can even lead to absolutely lower holdings of risky assets. Koo
(1991) conrms this for a multiperiod portfolio model.
The upshot of the discussion is that the portfolio eect of background risk depends
on whether certain restrictions on the utility function hold. This is mainly an empirical
question.
2.2 Wealth Elasticities and Risk Attitudes
The simplest way to look at portfolio choice problems is to analyze a two asset economy,
one asset being riskless, the other one risky. The traditional approach in expected util-
ity theory has established the relationship between wealth elasticities and risk aversion.
Under specic circumstances, one can even say something about precautionary motives
and portfolio choices, as we will show now:1 consider the problem of maximizing expected
1The roots can be traced back to the seminal contributions of Arrow and Pratt; the exposition here
follows Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995).4
utility of (random) nal wealth w1,E ( U ( w 1)). Final wealth is composed of investment in
and returns to a risky asset a, and a safe asset m = w0 − a. w0 is initial wealth. Thus,
w1 = w0(1 + rm)+a ( r a−r m). Note that the rst order condition
dE(U(w1))=da =E ( U 0( w 1)(ra − rm)) = 0 = g(a;w0;r m;F r a()) (1)
is a function g() of the choice variable a, and parameters such as the riskfree rate, rm >
−1, initial wealth, w0, and the distribution of the risky rate of return, Fra(). Expected
utility is uniquely maximized(SOC) under the assumption of global risk aversion, U00 < 0:
d
2E(U)=d
2a =E ( U
00(w1)(ra − rm)
2) < 0: (2)
To analyze the eect of w0 on a, dierentiate g totally to obtain
da=dw0 =( @g=@w0)=(−@g=@a): (3)
Since the denominator of (3) is positive, the sign is that of the numerator,
E(U
00(w1)(ra − rm)): (4)
In order to determine the sign of (4), one needs to determine the degree of absolute risk
aversion, (w1) − U 00(w1)=U0(w1):
E(U
00(w1)(ra − rm)) = −E((w1)U
0(w1)(ra − rm)) (5)
is positive under DARA,2 and risky assets are a normal good. In order to see whether a
is a luxury under DARA, further assumptions about the degree of relative risk aversion,
(w1)=w 1 ( w 1 ) are needed. From (3) write the elasticity of the demand for risky
assets with respect to initial wealth as
w0 = −(@g=@w0)=(@g=@a)w0=a
Using (4) and (2) we can re{write this as
w0 =








− (1 + rm)w0E(U00(w1)(ra − rm)) − aE(U00(w1)(ra − rm)2)
aE(U00(w1)(ra − rm)2)
(6)
Given positive demand for risky assets (a>0), the numerator in (6) is decisive. It can
be written as
−E(U
00(w1)(ra − rm)w1)=E (  ( w 1) U
0( w 1)(ra − rm)):
2To understand this, note that w1 and ra are positively correlated, given rm;w 0and a. Hence, ra >r m
when w1 is \large". Under DARA, 0() < 0 and thus (w1)w e i g h sU 0 ( w 1 )(ra − rm) more heavily if
ra <r mthan if ra >r m. The expected value in the right hand side of (5) will then be negative.5
Under the common assumption of CRRA,  = const. can be taken outside of the expec-
tation and hence w0 = 1 due to the FOC (1). Under DRRA, it follows that w0 > 1.3
In words: the investor is willing to give up a smaller fraction of her wealth in return for
insurance against a multiplicative risk as wealth increases. Therefore, a larger fraction is
invested in the risky asset with wealth. The relationship between the wealth elasticity of
the demand for risky assets and risk attitudes is summarized in table 1 (Appendix B).
Recall from the denition of absolute risk aversion () that absolute prudence can
be written as −U000=U00 =  − 0=. From here, it follows directly | after some simple
algebraic manipulations | that CRRA implies DARA and DAP (standardness, Kimball
(1993)). From a consistent estimate of the wealth elasticities of risky assets one could
possibly infer whether background risk will have an impact on the portfolio allocation, at
least if w0 =1h o l d s .B u ti f w 0 >1, for instance, this is not clear anymore: in this case,
we have DRRA (implying DARA) but cannot exclude the possibility that DAP does not
hold.4 Therefore, an empirical analysis calls for models which relate portfolio allocation
to background risk.
2.3 Related Empirical Literature
The empirical literature on precautionary savings has one of its roots in Euler equations
models testing the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH).5 What those studies discovered was that
the data could not suciently be explained by theoretical predictions: consumption has
been found to be excessivelysensitive to transitory income innovations to be in accordance
with the LCH. Moreover, it was found that the elderly have a tendency not to dissave,
which could be due to precautionary saving (accidental bequests, Davies (1981)). Most of
this literature was based on macro data, ignoring idiosyncratic income variability. Zeldes
(1989) showed that one would need to go beyond the case of certainty equivalence utility
functions in order to obtain consumption paths which could reconcilesome of the empirical
regularities. Zeldes' paper made a strong case for precautionary saving, using household
data.6
With the use of micro data it became customary to derive some measure of income
uncertainty from an estimated income process (see for instance, Carroll and Samwick
(1995a,b), Hubbard et al. (1994), or Jianakoplos et al. (1996)). Kazarosian (1997),
for instance, estimates a specication which explains the current asset{to{permanent
income ratio from income uncertainty and permanent income. Both permanent income
3The conclusion follows by similar reasoning as for (5), cf. fn. 2.
4The condition for DAP to hold is that the second derivative of RA, 00 is either positive, or, if it
is negative exceeds 0[1 + 0=2], which is negative since DRRA implies DARA implies that prudence
exceeds RA (Kimball (1990)). This condition is stronger than risk vulnerability (see Gollier and Pratt
(1996)) or even properness (Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987)).
5For introduction and overview see Deaton (1992).
6More can be found in the excellent survey of Browning and Lusardi (1996).6
and income uncertainty are derived from estimates of a random eects (RE) model for
current income, explained from occupation and age. Focus is on explaining observed
behavior in the 1966 wave, incorporating information on permanent income and income
uncertaintywhich thus pertains to future values. Two uncertaintymeasures are considered
and yield signicantly positive estimates.
Based on this approach, Chakraborty and Kazarosian (1996) study portfolio compo-
sition by regressing the share of specic assets in total wealth on occupation and em-
ployment variables, among others. Distinguished asset types are risky and illiquid assets
(housing, real estate, business), safe and liquid assets (government bonds, savings ac-
counts) and risky and liquid assets (shares, bonds, mutual funds). The authors nd that
people in general move away from assets which are both risky and illiquid, and towards
liquid assets, both risky and safe, as income uncertainty increases.
The idea of estimating income processes is a viable approach to assess income uncer-
tainty in the absence of other information relating to future income developments. It is
important to know what people expect their income to be in the future and how certain
or uncertain they are about their own expectation. A variation in income over time only
bears a loose connection to this requirement. In general, consumers themselves will have
more information to predict their own income than an outside observer who has to rely
on historical income data. In this sense, it is preferable to use subjective expectations
data about income and income variations.7 The Italian SHIW data contain some infor-
mation about this, pertaining to a 1 year horizon. The SHIW data were used by Guiso
et al. (1992, 1996) to assess the relevance of income uncertainty for precautionary sav-
ing, and portfolio choice, respectively. To correct for biases stemming from the general
price development, the authors can also exploit information about inﬂation uncertainty.
The reported ndings attribute only a small role for income variance in saving behavior.
Their measure might only capture transitory income shocks, and be of more concern for
liquidity constrained households. Lusardi (1996) re{assesses the Guiso et al. measure
and interprets it as dislike of income uncertainty on the background of job stability. She
reports evidence that the probability of a non{zero income variance falls with on{the{job
tenure. She nds a somewhat stronger impact for income uncertainty on saving than
Guiso et al. (1992).
Guiso et al. (1996) analyze the impact of human capital risk on nancial portfolios.
They model the choice between risky and non{risky assets by a two{limit Tobit speci-
cation. The denition of risky assets encompasses equities, investment fund units, and
corporate and government debt. An alternative, broader measure includes saving accounts
as well. As saving accounts dominate nancial assets, their inclusion in the category of
risky assets does have a major impact on the distribution of the dependent variable, but
7But note the nding of Das and Van Soest (1996) that heads of households tend to systematically
underestimate their income growth; this calls into question rational expectation formation.7
the coecient on income variance in the regression is hardly aected. Expected inﬂation
variance is insignicant in all specications but has a noticeable impact on the magnitude
of the coecient of income variance. The authors also investigate the impact of liquidity
constraints on portfolio choice and nd a signicantly negative value only if saving ac-
counts are included in the denition of the dependent variable. In a further robustness
analysis, the size of the coecient on income variance turns out to be sensitive to the
assumptions of homoskedastic normal errors of the Maximum Likelihood Tobit estimator.
The current paper compares closely to that of Guiso et al. (1996) in many respects,
since both use micro{data on assets, model portfolio choice in comparable ways, and
assess income uncertainty from subjective information. In our paper we put somewhat
more stress on robust estimation, but deviate from Guiso et al. in a couple of more
essential respects: we discuss in more depth alternative measures of income uncertainty
and compare the robustness of the ndings across those dierent measures, and, next to
cross{section data we also employ panel data information. The latter has the advantage
that we can accommodate unobserved individual eects which can capture important
behavioral characteristics.
Both the interesting data source and the econometric techniques employed merit some
further discussion. We will next describe the data we have available. As it turns out, we
have information which allows us both to avoid arbitrary assumptions on the underlying
income process and to infer impacts from long{term uncertainty.
3 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data Set
For the question addressed in this paper we favor a micro data set which entails de-
tailed information on the asset structure of household wealth, and which allows to assess
idiosyncratic income risk or precautionary motives of individual decision makers.
The data set we choose is the so{called VSB panel, launched by the VSB{CentER
savings project in 1993. For cross{section analysis, we exploit the rst wave, containing
ﬂow (income and work) information for 1992 and wealth related information for January
1, 1993 (1993 wave). Analogously, the 1994 wave provides ﬂow information for 1993 and
stock information for January 1, 1994, and so on. The information for this second wave
has actually been requested only a few months after the information for the rst wave had
been collected. Therefore, many of the questions were only asked to the new entrants to
the panel and not to old households. A second complete wave is again available for 1995.
The VSB panel consists of two samples, one representative of the Dutch population
(REP),8 covering approximately 2000 households, and one sample drawn from the upper
8As it turns out, home owners are over{represented in the \representative" sample; this might have8
decileof the income distribution (HIP),9 encompassing roughly 800 households. The latter
has the advantage of yielding more insight into nancial behavior of richer households due
to the higher asset level, and more diversied portfolios. The data collection has been
performed on{line via terminal sessions. Respondents were asked to key in answers to
questions they received via a modem on a personal computer. The data set is in its
features most closely comparable to the triennial US Survey of Consumer Finances.
Compared to other data sets, the VSB panel has considerable strengths. The ques-
tionnaire has been specically tailored to facilitate micro{econom(etr)ic and psychological
research on savings, in a very encompassing way. Questions covered general information
on the household and individual household members, and detailed questions on income
from all sources, work history and current work status, pension claims, health, and assets
and debts. Respondents were requested to look up income and wealth information from
pay slips, tax forms, and account statements, as far as possible. Ownership information
on assets and debts is complete and known even for those cases where the amount held
was unknown. In addition, there is a set of questions referring to economic{psychological
concepts which in principle are designed to allow inferences about time preference rates,
risk aversion, nancial attitudes and savings behavior, and choice of banks. The current
paper employs variables from all sections of the questionnaire, although particular em-
phasis is put on assets and debts and the subjective information from the \psychological"
part.
3.2 Variables
\The main diculty in the empirical analysis is to nd appropriate measures of income
risk [. . .]" (Guiso et al (1996, p. 160)).
To analyze the impact of income uncertainty on portfolio composition we explain
the (budget) share allocated to certain assets in total assets by a number of household
characteristics, wealth, and some measure of income uncertainty or precautionary motives.
The wealth information is available at the asset level per respondent. We aggregate
over assets per respondent and over respondents within each household. RHS variables
relate to the information for the head of the household.
As dependent variable we choose the ratio of riskless and liquid assets to nancial
wealth. We select checking accounts, saving accounts, and deposit books into the category
\riskless and liquid". We include neither liquid, but risky assets, nor riskless but illiq-
uid assets. Other available assets (employer sponsored savings plan, savings certicates,
growth funds, mutual funds, bonds/mortgage bonds, shares, life insurance contracts) de-
an eect on the portfolio structure and wealth holdings of households in general.
9the cut{o point has been chosen to be 105,000 guilders9
fault into residual nancial assets.
In terms of precautionary savings any asset can be used to cover expenses due to
unforeseen circumstances, such as particularly bad draws in earnings, even if there are
considerably high transaction costs associated with it (see Carroll and Samwick (1995b)
for discussion.) The choice made here includes those assets which can broadly be viewed
as \riskless". Housing, other real estate, and mortgages, are often viewed as risky assets
as well (cf. Henderson and Ioannides (1983)), and would enter the denominator of the
dependent variable when we would use total wealth. Here, we observe a substantial
number of households with negative total net worth due to high mortgages, violating the
interpretation of the dependent variable as a budget share. Moreover, in the second wave
of the survey (1994), real estate wealth is only available for new panel entrants.
For the same reason why we do not consider total net worth, we exclude negative
checking account balances and consumer debts. Thus, the budget share as the dependent
variable is censored at zero and one. Observations with zero nancial wealth drop out.
This concerns 12% of the observations. In addition, 23 observations drop out due to
missing values on income uncertainty. In the remaining sample, 2.2% of the observations
are censored at 0 and 43% at 1.10
Both riskless and nancial wealth are the sums of several asset components, each of
which is aected by item{nonresponse. A missing value in one of the components carries
through to the aggregate and thus causes severe problems of missing observations. In
order to reduce this, the missing values have been treated as zeros, although they are
known to be non{zero. Thus, the obtained wealth measures are for some observations
\minimum levels" | the true asset holdings for those households are larger and thus
the wealth measures are censored from below at that minimum level. Clearly, when the
dependent variable is a share where both numerator and denominator are subject to this
censoring problem, this causes an intricate problem which is not straightforward to solve.
For an equation explaining the level of wealth this would lead to a specication where
censoring is from above at individual censoring points (i.e. at the \minimum levels").
But for the share equation we will thus ignore the separate censoring on nominator and
denominator of the share.11
In the model which we consider, we will explain the portfolio share of riskless and
liquid assets from household characteristics like age, education, nancial wealth, labor
market variables, marital status, some income indicator, and some measure of income
uncertainty or precautionary motives. Variables such as age and marital status are self{
explanatory. Explanations for some other RHS variables are given below in the note to
10These numbers refer to 1993 and the baseline specication we will focus on.
11One can straightforwardly take into account censoring on the numerator only. This then translates
into censoring on the share as additional right{censoring (3.5%) with individual censoring points. This
kind of \censored regression model" is rather ad{hoc and estimates do not dier substantially from Tobit
estimates.10
table 4. We focus on measures of income uncertainty.
Before introducing the alternative measures, we discuss an important point. The
theoretical literature on background risk and portfolio choice does not address the question
which evaluation horizon is important for assessment of income uncertainty. This is
because models are usually of an atemporal type. It has been argued, however, that it
is life{time uncertainty which matters for the level of precautionary saving (see, among
others, Carroll and Samwick (1995a,b)). So, if consumers optimize their consumption
paths by maximizing expected lifetime utility, the whole future process of income risk will
be relevant for that consumption plan, and hence, saving.12 Appliedto the portfolio choice
problem, this argument would favor a long{run measure of uncertainty. Admittedly, this
is not so clear, as portfolios can be re{structured even in response to short term shocks
to income, without having major repercussions for the level of saving or the expectation
of the consumption path in the long{run. The reason why this is not frequently observed
might be entirely due to transaction costs. In the analysis we will both estimate cross{
section and xed eects panel data models. In panel data models, transaction costs which
are time{invariant can be captured by the xed eects, such that the distinction between
long and short horizon becomes less important.
If we assume income uncertainty to be generated from exogenous earnings processes,
we can use some measure of it as a regressor. Care has to be taken in constructing such
a measure. Two possibilities exist:
1. An ordinal measure which indicates to which extent heads of households are cer-
tain about their own expectations regarding household net income; this measure
is available for a short (12 months) and a longer (5 years) horizon; for reference,
this measure will be called \income uncertainty" in the sequel. In cross{section
models, the longer horizon measure will be interpreted as the analogue of \perma-
nent income shocks". The short{run measure should have an impact if liquidity
constraints are of importance. We will weigh up the short{run against the long{run
measure in a sensitivity analysis. The information in the data set is a categorical
variable for four dierent degrees of uncertainty about the household's income ex-
pectation, and conditional on a point expectation for income growth. This variable
is split up into two dummies indicating whether the head of household is either
\rather certain" (moderate income uncertainty), or \not very certain" or \not cer-
tain at all" (high income uncertainty). The pooling of two categories seemed called
for due to the relatively low frequency (2.6%) of the last category. The reference
category is \very certain" (low income uncertainty).13
12See Blundell and Stoker (1994) for an analysis of the impact of the timing of income risk on consump-
tion and consumption growth. It appears that assumptions about the particular form of risk aversion are
important for the timing eect.
13For wording of the survey questions cf. Appendix A, variables (c)a n d( g )11
2. A continuous measure of the variance of expected income one year ahead, construct-
ed from a set of questions on the likelihood of given income changes. The answers to
this set of seven questions were ordinal but have been converted into a continuous
measure of variance under some simplifying assumptions.14 The measure is roughly
similar to the one chosen by Guiso et al. (1992, 1996) for Italian survey data. It
will be called \income variance" from now on.
Alternatively, we can consider direct measures of precautionary motives:
3. A range of questions asks directly for saving motives. Heads of households were
asked to indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 the degree of importance for a number of
saving motives. Among them are motives for saving \for unforeseen expenses as the
result of injuries or accidents", \to cover income losses due to unemployment", \for
unforeseen expenses", and \to cover outstanding debts". We refer to them simply
as \precautionary motives". The original precautionary motive is probably best
captured by the general motivefor unforeseen circumstances, but as all these motives
are related, it might be sensible to summarize them in one measure, applying factor
analysis. The information for these variables is available for the 1993 and 1995
waves and only for new panel entrants of the 1994 wave.
For our cross{sectional estimates, we regard a long{run horizon as more appropriate
to capture permanent income uncertainty. This information is only available for the rst
measure, and at best for a ve year horizon. We assume that a ve year horizon is a good
approximation to long{run uncertainty. At any rate this horizon is far longer than the
evaluation horizon in other data sets. If it were extended much further into the future, the
issue of possible endogeneity of income risk would have to be discussed. We also assume
that two dierent individuals with the same uncertainty would classify themselves in
the same category. Thus \rather certain" means the same degree of uncertainty across
individuals. As the \income uncertainty" measure is ordinal, calculation of elasticities is
precluded.
The second measure is continuous, but we have to make some simplifying assumptions
in order to retrieve it from the data. It pertains to income uncertainty 1 year ahead. Note,
that a measure of variance might not be suitable for investigating the impact of back-
ground risk on saving and portfolio behavior since in general variance is not a sucient
statistic of risk. An exception is a CARA utility with additive and normally distributed
income shocks (cf. Carroll and Samwick (1995b)).15
14The variables involved and the a more detailed description of the construction of this measure,
including the assumptions made is deferred to Appendix A.
15Instead, measures like the integral under the cdf of the random variable causing the risk or a measure
based on transfers of probability weights have been proposed, but they cannot be constructed from our
data (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)). Carroll and Samwick (1995b) advocate a measure which mirrors
Kimball's (1990) equivalent precautionary premium.12
Note that the corresponding questions in the survey refer to \income" which might
include asset income as well. Asset income uncertainty can more easily be avoided than
uncertainty from labor income, and thus the obtained measure of uncertainty might be
contaminated by portfolio risk. Given the low share of high{return assets in household
portfolios, the asset income will not be substantial for most households, though. Moreover,
even a measure of `pure' labor income risk might not be exogenous as people have a choice
of occupation and labor supply (see for instance, Lusardi (1996)).
Both these measures are based on \household net income". This income concept has a
couple of important advantages: rst, as it is after{tax, it does not have to be corrected for
the insurance eect of taxation, which as such can lead to higher demand for risky assets
(Elmendorf and Kimball (1991)). Second, as it pertains to the entire household, possible
risk{pooling within two or multiple earner households is already taken into account. We
are left with uncertainty that will not be inﬂuenced anymore by tax eects or income
pooling.
The setup of the questionnaire does not explicitly state that real income changes
should be considered; thus, the obtained measure for income uncertainty might have to
be corrected for the impact of inﬂation. Although there are questions which relate to
the inﬂation expectations,16 both one and ve years ahead, there is no information which
would allow to construct a measure of the second moment of the distribution of expected
inﬂation; thus, the approach as outlined in Guiso et al. (1992, 1996) is not feasible.
Instead, in the sensitivity analysis to follow we use a direct measure for the (level of)
price expectations of 5 years ahead.17
The \saving motives" as discussed above, serve to control directly for precautionary
motives. The questionnaire does not specify an evaluation horizon. In a way, these
variables measure properties of the preference structure. Income uncertainty will only
have an impact on saving behavior if households actually perceive it as a source of risk
that they have to forearm against by taking appropriate action (resource accumulation
and risk shifting), and if it is properly measured. A second interpretation is to view them
as proxying consumption risk, since the survey questions refer to \expenditures".
All the discussed measures have the advantage that they are readily available and
no imputation has to be done. In particular, they are forward looking and need not be
based on historical information. From the discussion above, we tend to prefer the \income
uncertainty" measure. The other two are discussed brieﬂy when we consider sensitivity
16variables (h) − (k) in Appendix A
17Guiso et al. (1996) report insignicant parameter estimates for inﬂation variance. Since one might
argue that in the Italian case inﬂation is both on a higher level and more volatile than in the Dutch case,
we have a prior that biases due to omitted inﬂation variance are negligible. Further support derives from
Das and Van Soest (1996) who make a case that Dutch households are concerned with real income when
asked questions about future income expectations where the questionnaire does not explicitly specify this.
Their measure is based only on a 12 months horizon.13
of the results with respect to the specication in section 5.
3.3 Summary Statistics
This subsection presents selected summary statistics of the data. Table 2 contains cross{
tabulations for the \income uncertainty" measure across evaluation horizons and across
panel waves, table 3 shows a breakdown of the share of riskless assets and of income
uncertainty by exogenous variables for 1993. We show the gures for those observations
which are used subsequently in the econometric analyses.
Tables 2a/b cross{tabulates the answers to the degree of income uncertainty18 con-
ditional on the expected income change,19 for the year 1993. There seems to be higher
uncertainty for people expecting their income to change over time. People expecting the
same income next year are relatively more certain about this. In the short run, labor
contracts are xed and income can be predicted quite well. This pattern can be observed
for the longer run as well, though. There is a higher percentage of people who are certain
among those who expect their income to fall over next 5 years, and a lower percentage
among those who expect an increase. There are about twice as many people who expect
their income to rise over the next ve years than people who expect a drop. Income
uncertainty rises20 as the horizon is shifted outward. This is documented in table 2c.
Especially the rst category loses, whereas the third gains. Otherwise, both measures are
strongly correlated. In addition, there are some ﬂuctuations across sampling years, as can
be seen from tables 2d, but they are rather unsystematic. We would therefore not expect
a large year eect.
Turn now to table 3. The rst two columns display some of the most important right
hand side variables in classes and the percentage of the respective class in the sample.
Columns three through seven describe the distribution of the share of riskless assets
(means and selected percentiles). The last three columns of table 3 contain the three
dierent categories for income uncertainty, with a 5 year horizon. Here, the percentages
add up rowwise to 1.
We observe a u{shaped age pattern for the mean share of riskless, liquid wealth:
whereas the lowest share is observed in the age group of 40 to 54 years, both younger
and older households invest a larger share in riskless assets. This pattern also obtains for
the 10th{40th percentile. In the youngest age group, more than 70% of households do
not hold any but liquid, riskless assets. Stratifying by education reveals that university
graduates invest relatively least of their nancial wealth holdings in riskless assets. The
lowest education group holds a more riskless portfolio.21 Self{employed hold somewhat
18the exact wording is given in Appendix A, variables (c)a n d( g ).
19variables (a − b)a n d( e−f ), Appendix A.
20in terms of higher frequencies for the category \high"
21cf. notes to table 4 for a denition of education levels.14
less liquid and riskless portfolios; but still, between 60% and 70% of all self{employed
hold more riskless than risky assets. Particularly liquid and riskless portfolios are held by
the unemployed. They play a minor role in the sample, however. A monotonic pattern
arises for nancial wealth: the higher nancial wealth, the lower the share of riskless
assets. There is a substantial difference between members of the representative panel
and high income households. As expected, richer households hold a lower share of their
nancial wealth in riskless and liquid assets. Splitting by income uncertainty reveals
those households who are certain about their income expectation to hold relatively more
risky portfolios than others. The pattern for the share of riskless assets is monotonically
increasing in income uncertainty, as theory predicts.
We will now discuss income uncertainty across subgroups of the sample. Splitting by
age reveals that people in the typical pre{retirement age (55{64 years) seem to face rather
low income uncertainty; they would typically know their position in the labor market and
have a rather distinct picture of their income development. For the youngest age group
income uncertainty is rather high. This might reﬂect career uncertainty. The highest
degree of income uncertainty across educational subgroups is found for the category \ju-
nior vocational". It contains people with a lower vocational education and those with
an apprenticeship. Graduates from vocational colleges seem to have the lowest degree of
uncertainty: there are relatively more people in this group who claim that their estimate
of their future income is certain, and relatively less who are not very certain. Not dis-
played in the table are dierences across evaluation horizon. For the 1 year horizon we
nd higher income uncertainty for the least educated. Our measure of income uncertainty
does not lend support to the view that self{employed face higher uncertainty from income
than employees: cf. the Pearson 2−statistic which indicates no signicant dierences.
Cross{tabulating by nancial wealth quintile gives the following picture: households with
high income uncertainty are more concentrated in the lower end of the wealth distribution.
Households in the upper quintile seem to have lower uncertainty.
4 Estimation
The subsequent analysis focuses on explaining the demand for riskless assets as a (budget)
share in nancial wealth. Consistent with an Engel curve of the Almost Ideal Demand
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where y is the desired share of riskless assets in nancial wealth, x is a vector of explana-
tory variables, and  denotes the error term. The inclusion of i denotes individual eects
which have been ignored by other studies so far. We will come back to the importance
of those eects later when we discuss panel data estimators. In cross{section analyses we15
have to ignore them. We treat y as a censored variable, implying that y is only exactly
observed in the open interval (0;1). Components of x are nancial wealth, a measure
of income uncertainty, and other variables which account for wealth accumulation and
allocation (typically age and education or labor market variables).
This section discusses several ways of estimating the relation (7), both for cross{section
and panel data, taking the censoring on y as far as possible into account. Presentation
of results is deferred to section 5.
Cross{Section Estimators. An apparent rst choice cross{section estimator for (7)
is a parametric Tobit Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator with a lower limit at 0 and an
upper one at 1 under the assumptions of homoskedastic and normally distributed errors.
However, if those assumptions are not met, the ML estimates will be inconsistent. One
way to deal with heteroskedasticity is to allow the error variance to depend on covariates
(for example, i = cexp(ziγ)). Still, in the face of non{normality the parameter estimates
might not be robust with respect to outliers.
The Tobit model assumes implicitly that the same underlying decision process drives
both the participation decision and the decision of how much to invest in the asset un-
der consideration. An alternative to this is the (standard) bivariate double hurdle model,
which treats the censored observations, in particular the \1's" dierently (cf. Blundell and
Meghir (1987), for instance): a rst hurdle | `the participation equation' | determines
in how far households are willing to hold non{riskless assets in the rst place, whereas the
censoring from the Tobit equation acts as the second hurdle which has to be overcome.
Assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity are maintained for this estimator. We
impose exclusion restrictions for identication. The double hurdle model is somewhat
more appealing in terms of explaining economic outcomes than the Tobit, but due to its
parametric assumptions it suers from the same vulnerability with respect to misspeci-
cation as the Tobit. Therefore, we consider Tobit{type semiparametric estimators in the
sequel.
Powell (1984) introduced as an alternative to the standard Tobit a conditional median
estimator (CLAD) allowing for censoring. Powell (1986a) generalized the estimator to
other quantiles. The model species a linear relationship between the latent variable
y
i and regressors xi, y
i = xi + i for the {th quantile. Only yi is observed whose
distribution is censored at yci (yci = 1 in our case). If censoring is from above, the
estimator minimizes the objective function
n X
i=1
(yi − minfyci;x i g)
where (z) is the so{called \check function" (z)=( −1[z<0])z.
Errors are assumed to be independent, but not necessarily identically distributed.
This allows for (bounded) heteroskedasticity. A conditional quantile restriction of the16
form Q(ijxi) = 0 is imposed. The conditional distribution function F(jx) is assumed
to be continuously dierentiable around zero, and the conditional density is assumed to be
positive at zero, f(0jx) > 0. Regressors are assumed to have nite support but need not
be discrete. Inclusion of an intercept is required for consistency of the slope coecients.
In order to guarantee uniqueness of the estimator, the behavior of the regression function
xi has to be restricted. It is required that xi  yci for suciently many observations.
In addition, regressors must not be collinear for those observations. The censored quantile
regression estimator is strongly consistent. Further regularity conditions are imposed to
derive asymptotic normality.
The motivation for estimating quantile regressions is threefold: First, estimating sev-
eral quantiles allows to get a more complete picture of the conditional distribution of
yjx. Under homoskedasticity, the conditional quantile functions are parallel hyperplanes,
but this need not hold under heteroskedasticity to which the estimator is fairly robust.
Second, the estimator does not require specication of the error distribution as does the
parametric Tobit. From a practical perspective, conditional median estimation (CLAD)
would be the usual alternative to a standard Tobit, if one was only interestedin the central
tendency. But this proves infeasible with our data due to the high degree of censoring.
We can obtain estimates for other quantiles below the median, though. Realize that when
censoring is from above, the higher the quantile, the less precision can be expected from
the estimator since then the quantile of y becomes uninformative about the true parame-
ter value for large parts of the sample. This is the third reason to `center' the distribution
of y at lower quantiles. A short outline on optimization is given in Appendix C.
Standard errors can be obtained in dierent ways, cf. Appendix D. We use the Design
Bootstrap Estimator which is based on re{sampling pairs of observations (cf. Efron and
Tibshirani (1993)). Bootstrapping has the advantage that it avoids stringent assumptions
on the underlying error distribution and the choice of smoothing parameters.
Panel Data Estimators. Consider estimating model (7) including individual eects
i. A dierence between cross{section and panel data models is that even in the absence
of a dynamic specication the panel data estimator is more general in the following sense:
xed eects capture everything which is individually constant but unobserved. These
might be related to preference parameters and indeed determine behavior, so that they
have to be taken into account. They can be correlated with the regressors and even with
the error terms.
Fixed eects estimators have an advantage over random eects estimators because the
stochastic restrictions one has to place on the unobserved individual eects are less severe
in the xed eects case. In essence, they partly capture endogeneity of RHS variables. In
addition, in the presence of attrition bias the estimates of the coecients of interest, ,
will be less seriously aected when a xed eects estimator is used (Verbeek and Nijman17
(1992)). A direct Tobit analog to the linear within estimator which dierences xed eects
out does not exist under censoring. The parametric approach to estimate the FE Tobit
model by ML would therefore have to estimate all individual eects. Estimates for i
would be inconsistent as T = xed, which triggers inconsistency of the estimated 's.
Honor e (1992) devised a semiparametric Tobit type estimator for two waves of a pan-
el, which takes account of xed eects. The estimator comes in the form of a trimmed
\least absolute deviations (LAD)" and a \least squares (LS)" variant. Honor e (1992)
assumes that (y
1;y
2) are, conditional on (x1;x 2;), symmetrically distributed around the
45 degree line through the point (x;0), where x = x2 −x1. This follows directly if
one assumes errors 1 and 2 between two waves to be continuously i.i.d. conditional on
the regressors and xed eects, (x1;x 2;). However, the estimator also allows for i.n.i.d.
observations, and for correlation between error terms. Errors need not be homoskedastic
across individuals, but they do have to be homoskedastic over time for a given individual.
Both versions of the estimator are
p
N{consistent and asymptotically normal, yet asymp-
totically not ecient.22 The idea is a generalization of Powell's (1986b) symmetrically
censored least squares estimator for the cross{sectional case. As it leaves the error distri-
bution unspecied, Honor e's estimator is thus far more general than feasible ML{based
methods (i.e. the so{called \Chamberlain (1984)" approach).
In the application we will focus on the \LS" version of the estimator. The symmetry
property under the above assumptions allows to derive a moment condition of the form23
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In order to establish the asymptotic properties and to estimate the covariance matrix,
it is assumed that E(x0x) has full rank. The implication is that only time varying
regressors can be used as conditioning variables. Time constant variables are subsumed
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This objective function is globally convex in parameters and the minimum can be found
using standard gradient methods.24
22Charlier et al. (1995) have devised an ecient GMM estimator based on Honore's (1992) FE Tobit
estimator, involving non{parametric components. They report evidence that the eciency gain can be
small in small samples. Therefore, we do not resort to their estimator.
23In fact, Honore also derives moment conditions for both \LS" and \LAD" estimators under trunca-
tion. Those will be used in constructing a statistic to test for the symmetry assumption.
24The \LAD"{type estimator has a piecewise linear, convex objective function, which can be minimized18
In order to apply Honor e's (1992) \LS" estimator to unbalanced panel data, we adopt
the following procedure (cf. Charlier et al. (1995)): rst, estimate the \LS" estimator ;0
for every conceivable pair f(;0)j1  < 0T gof panel waves. These estimates will
dier from each other. Second, use a Minimum Distance (MD) step to restrict estimates








where H are the rst{round estimates, stacked in a vector, and Ψ is a matrix of linear
restrictions between T and H. Ω is the covariance matrix of H used as weighting matrix
in the MD step.25 Although the resulting estimator is asymptotically not ecient, it is
a consistent two{step estimator. The major advantages are that it allows for unbalanced
panel data estimation and is straightforward to implement.
5 Portfolio responses to income uncertainty
In the special case where agents have CRRA utility, there is an indirect approach to de-
termine whether precautionary motives matter for portfolio allocation, as should be clear
from subsection 2.2. In a preliminary approach we estimated wealth elasticities separate-
ly for an array of assets. Inferring risk aversion from the estimated share equation, as is
done here, is a more unifying approach, since the specication of the share is consistent
with a general demand system. With both approaches, the estimates are consistent with
DRRA. Since this does not allow to assess the existence of decreasing absolute prudence
directly, some more identifying information is needed. This can come from our measures
of income uncertainty and precautionary motives.
5.1 Specication and Findings
The main ndings are summarized in tables 4{6 (Appendix B). In this section we discuss
a baseline specication. A sensitivity analysis with respect to specication is provided in
the following subsection. We will focus on the year 1993 when we discuss cross{section
results.
Cross{Section Estimates. The baseline specication explains the share of riskless
assets from age, education, nancial wealth, labor market variables, family status, and
using simplex methods (cf. Press et al. (1989) for algorithms). It requires the choice of a smoothing
parameter, though, for which little guidance is available. The latter seems to have prevented Honore
(1992, section 6) from using it in his Monte Carlo{based performance check.
25Ωi sc a l c u l a t e da sH − 1G 0GH−1 where G is the matrix of rst derivatives and H the (blockdiagonal)
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income uncertainty. A ﬂexible age pattern is allowed for by including a cubic polynomial.
Education is included to proxy for life{time wealth (Hubbard et al. (1994), for example).
The dummy variable for being married or cohabiting controls for family size. Financial
wealth is modeled as a linear spline of log nancial wealth. This serves to reduce the
impact of measurement error while allowing for sucient ﬂexibility. As knots we chose
points relating to the 20%{, 40%{, 60%{, 80%{percentiles of the distribution of nancial
wealth. The `panel' variable distinguishes households from the so{called `representative
panel' (REP, the reference category) and the `high{income panel' (HIP), and serves to
control for income, which is not directly included in the equations due to severe problems
with item non{response. From the budget{share approach it is wealth anyhow which is
important, not income.
In the following discussion we focus on the eect of the income uncertainty on the
investment in riskless, liquid assets. In the Tobit equation in table 4, the eect of income
uncertainty has the expected sign: more income uncertainty leads to reduction in avoid-
able risks, here portfolio risk. Clearly, the higher the degree of income uncertainty the
higher the share of nancial wealth which the household invests in riskless assets. Thus,
the found \eect" seems reasonable, even though the dummy variable for the category of
moderate uncertainty is not signicant. A Wald test does not reject the hypothesis that
the coecients are jointly zero.
Estimates can be aected by heteroskedasticity, even though the dependent variable
is a share. A conditional moment test (cf. Newey (1985) and Pagan and Vella (1989))
suggests that heteroskedasticity is present (the test statistic has a value of 604.67 at 25
degrees of freedom (df); this value should be compared to the 2 distribution). Likewise,
normality is rejected by a conditional moment test (127.42 at 2 df). Unlikethe assumption
of a particular family of the error distribution, heteroskedasticity can be dealt with in the
Tobit by specifying the standard deviation of the error term to be dependent on other
explanatory variables.26 The t−values change somewhat, as is evident from table 4. An
LR test supports the conclusion that heteroskedasticity matters in these data.
From the estimated coecients we can compute wealth elasticities for the investment
in risky assets. With the current specication we nd:27
These estimates are consistent with decreasing relative risk aversion. But we cannot
conclude that consumers have decreasing absolute prudence.
26The variance depends on age, the linear spline in log nancial wealth, labor market variables and the
dummy for panel membership (REP/HIP). This selection is arbitrary but parsimonious. Alternatives
have been rejected on the basis of LR tests.
27The elasticity for risky assets can be derived from the estimates as  =1− s= (1−y)w h e r e sis the
spline s coecient for log nancial wealth in the share equation for riskless assets. Since this elasticity
depends on the data, y, we calculate it at the mean, the rst quartile and the median of y. Standard
errors are obtained via the \delta" method.20
spline of log nancial wealth mean of y 1st quartile of y median of y
1st quintile 3.07 (0.59) 2.03 (0.29) 6.80 (1.65)
2nd quintile 1.89 (0.28) 1.44 (0.14) 3.49 (0.80)
3rd quintile 1.71 (0.20) 1.36 (0.10) 3.00 (0.57)
4th quintile 1.77 (0.15) 1.39 (0.07) 3.17 (0.42)
5th quintile 1.53 (0.11) 1.26 (0.05) 2.47 (0.30)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
Next to the Tobit estimates we present estimates for a double hurdle model, which
treats the \1's" dierently: the decision to hold only riskless, liquid assets may be driven
by other considerations than the censoring story would imply. As exclusion restrictions we
use dummy variables indicating very strong, strong, or general support for the following
statement:
\I am very interested in nancial matters (insurances, investments, etc.):" :::::::::
. :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::fanswer on 7 point scale g
This set of questions has been asked to all respondents in the sample, irrespective
of asset ownership. They can be interpreted as measure of informational status of the
investor and should have a direct impact on the willingness to participate in markets
for other than riskless and liquid assets.28 The estimates are based on a bivariate spec-
ication, under the assumption of homoskedastic and normally distributed errors. The
estimated correlation coecient is signicantly positive and with a value of 0.76 rather
high. Comparing likelihood values between this model and the homoskedastic Tobit in-
dicates that the introduction of the additional hurdle is a signicant contribution to the
model.29 As apparent from the table, the eect of income uncertainty is slightly stronger,
even though it is negligible in the participation equation. Judged by a Wald test, the co-
ecients of income uncertainty are jointly insignicant. Attempts to estimate the model
under a heteroskedasticity specication (as done with the Tobit) failed.
Table 5a displays quantile regression models which take account of censoring. The
covariance matrix was estimated by bootstrapping pairs of observations (yi;x i). The
bootstrap samples were of the same size as the original sample. 250 bootstrap iterations
28This is the hypothesis maintained by King and Leape (1987) who see information as a core determi-
nant of portfolio decisions.
29Tobit and double hurdle are nested if one restricts the probability of the participation equation to
be unity, cf. Blundell and Meghir (1987). Note that our specication is somewhat more general than the
one discussed in Blundell and Meghir (1987) as we do not restrict the correlation coecient between the
equations to be zero.21
were used.30 This estimator is robust to heteroskedasticity.
Compared to the censored mean regressions (Tobits), the parameter estimates change
somewhat in terms of size and signicance levels. The indicator for high income uncer-
tainty has a large signicant impact on the share invested in riskless wealth only for the
0.2 quantile. Both estimates and t−values rst increase and then decrease as the quantiles
increase. A Wald test does again not reject the hypothesis that both dummies measuring
income uncertainty have zero coecient.
Again the estimates suggest that as nancial wealth goes up, the share of riskless
wealth goes down (DRRA). As we go across quantiles, the eect of income uncertainty on
holding riskless assets is non{linear when the share of riskless wealth increases. House-
holds in the 0.2 quantile of the share{of{riskless{assets distribution are more sensitive to
incomeuncertainty. Clearly, they hold more risky portfolios than those in higher quantiles.
Beyond the 0.2 quantile, the eect of income uncertainty is reduced (both in magnitude
and in signicance). Statistically, the dierences across quantiles are an indication for
heteroskedasticity; in a homoskedastic sample the conditional quantile estimates should
follow the central tendency of yjx. Buchinsky (1996) outlines a Minimum Distance ap-
proach to test for heteroskedasticity. Under the Null of homoskedastic errors, the devised
test statistic is based on the equality of slope parameters across dierent quantiles. The
test statistic takes a value of 137.83 at 72 degrees of freedom. Compared to the percentiles
of a 2− distribution, homoskedasticity is rejected at the 5% level.31
The quantile estimator also allows to trace out the entire conditional distribution of
the dependent variable by varying the parameter  from 0 to 1. This is displayed in gure
1. We have estimated all percentiles of the distribution of yjx and averaged the predicted
percentile ^ Q(yijxi)=m i n f x i^   ;yc ig over all individuals i by subsample, which results
in a picture of the empirical distribution function, conditional on income uncertainty.32
Again it is apparent that the higher income uncertainty, the more probability mass is
concentrated around high shares (indicating riskless portfolios).
Panel Data Estimates. Table 6a displays results from applying the Honor e (1992)
estimator. Censoring is from above at 1. The variables chosen are the wealth variables
and income uncertainty. Other variables present in the cross{section specication do not
appear explicitly since they are xed over time for a given individual (like education).33
They are taken care of by the xed eects. Starting values have been obtained from
the standard linear within estimator, ignoring censoring. The rst three sets of columns
30Note that bootstrapping residuals is not applicable since residuals are unobservable due to censoring.
Cf. Appendix D for further details.
31For this test, Powell's (1986a) estimator of the covariance matrix under homoskedasticity was used,
bandwidth selection was guided by the Hall and Horowitz (1990) method; cf. Appendix D.
32Due to non{convergence at higher quantiles, we can only display a part of the function.
33Many other variables did not have a sucient within{variation. For labor market variables the
information has not been requested in the 1994 wave.22
display the Honor e estimates for all pairs of available waves (pairwise balanced), the last
two columns combines those estimates into a single one using a MD step (unbalanced).
The nancial wealth spline is still signicant, as it was in the cross sectional models.
We have chosen the same kink points for the splines across waves, i.e. we xed the knots
at the 1993 quintiles for reason of comparability. Also, nancial wealth has been deﬂated
using the consumer price index. The eect of income uncertainty is not as clear as it was
in the cross sectional Tobit specications, with the exception of the non{adjacent waves
1993 and 1995. The eect vanishes completely for the MD estimates. This might entirely
be due to the individual xed eects which the panel data estimators take into account.
Apparently, there is a positive correlation between xed eects and income uncertainty:
once xed eects are taken into account, they take away some of the explanatory power of
income uncertainty. Clearly, if we think of the estimator of a within{type which dierences
all variables from their individual means over time, then the \permanent" component of
income uncertainty is dierenced out. We are left with \temporary" uncertainty which
we should not expect to have any explanatory power for savings or portfolio choice. But
note as well that the estimator is not ecient. Moreover, the underlying assumptions of
the estimator may not be met by the data. This concerns in particular the symmetry
assumption. A conditional moment test rejects symmetry at the 5% level (test statistic:
79.80, 6 df).34
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
This section considers deviations from the baseline specication into several directions,
both for the cross{sectional censored quantile regressions and for the panel data estimates.
In the cross{sectional case we rst consider the `income uncertainty' measure for a hori-
zon of 12 months (panel b of the tables presented below). We then look at the alternative
measures (c) `income variance' and (d and e) `precautionary motives'. Subsequently, we
explore the sensitivity of the specication wrt to some RHS variables, taking account of
interaction terms. In the baseline specication we do not take into account the level of
the income expectation. However, due to the theoretical requirement that the marginal
utility be convex, it is conceivable that the eects of income uncertainty on the share
of riskless assets will depend on the level of the expected income change (f). Income
expectations are measured by subjective point estimates. Further, we use interaction ef-
fects of income uncertainty with wealth (g). Next, if nancial wealth is endogenous, is
the specication sensitive to either dropping those variables altogether (this would be a
\reduced form" interpretation of the estimated equation, h) or to using predicted value
as a continuous measure on the RHS (i)? We also explore whether pension entitlements
34The moments for this test are based on (8) and the moments of the truncated version of the \LS"
estimator which is not used in estimation. Under symmetry both those moment conditions have to be
met. Cf. Honore (1992) and Charlier et al. (1995).23
(j) should be used as a conditioning variable, and address the impact of bequest motives
as an alternative saving motive (k). Also, the level of inﬂation expectation a predictor of
the asset allocation (l) will be considered.
Cross{Section Estimates. Table 5b displays the coecients of variables which are
directly of interest. The subpanels are numbered as explained above. The dierence in
the number of observations is due to item non{response in at least one of the underlying
variables.
Interestingly, in panel b the short{run measure for high income uncertainty is signi-
cant in some of the quantile regressions. From the theoretical discussion above, we would
have expected the long{run measure to be a more appropriate measure. The presumption
that transaction costs would be of particular relevance in cross{section estimates, which
should be reﬂected in a stronger eect for the long{run measure, does not seem to be
supported. Another possibility is that households are myopic and do not consider risks
which are far away in time for portfolio allocation.
The continuous measure of income variance ( c), which is also based on a 1 year
horizon, yields hardly signicant estimates, though.
The measure for `precautionary motives' shows a signicant parameter estimate for
the 0.2 and 0.3 quantiles in the broad interpretation (d). This measure captures other
related risks as well, like health risks, unemployment risks, and risks from outstanding
debts (the latter could be interpreted as future liquidity risks). The narrow measure
(unforeseen expenditure alone) (panel e) is insignicant throughout.
In panels f and g we interact income uncertainty with income expectation and wealth,
respectively. Wald tests suggest that the interaction terms are jointly insignicant.
Financial wealth might be endogenous. One reason to suppose this is that if income
uncertainty is a life{cycle phenomenon, households will respond with a higher level of
saving to increased background risk. These additional savings are channeled into all
dierent sorts of assets and thus increase nancial wealth as such. There are two short{
cuts to deal with the problem: either one excludes nancial wealth altogether, hoping
that the other variables in the specication will pick up its eect (reduced form), or
one predicts log nancial wealth from a set of other variables. We use predictions from a
censored median regression (with individual censoring points) of the log of nancial wealth
on most of the other socio{demographic characteristics displayed in the other tables, plus
the variables on nancial interest, cf. p. 20 , which serve as exclusion restrictions.35.T h i s
is done in the subsequent panels (h and i) in the table. Although changes are observed
for some of the point estimates, the conclusions are unaected. We would therefore not
view nancial wealth to cause a considerable endogeneity bias for income uncertainty.36
35Estimates are available upon request.
36Lee (1995) proposes a way to deal with endogeneity in the following way: rst estimate reduced
form equations for both the share equation and an equation explaining nancial wealth; then, impose24
Taking account of pension entitlement, bequest motives, or price expectations has on-
ly negligible impacts on the coecients of income uncertainty (cf. panels j through l).
This can be interpreted as weak evidence that neither the existence of old{age income
provision, nor competing saving motives, nor inﬂation bias the ndings reported for the
baseline case.
Panel Data Estimates. A sensitivity analysis following the same lines is provided
in table 6b. The table displays MD estimates, except for the cases where variables of
interest are not available for one of the waves. As in the cross{sectional case we conclude
that the baseline specication is robust to the changes considered.
5.3 Closing remark on estimates
What have we learned from the data? The estimates presented in this paper lend some
but not unanimous support to the hypothesis that uninsurable earnings risk as perceived
by the individual household leads to reduction in avoidable portfolio risk. Especially
with panel data models the hypothesis of income uncertainty not causing any signicant
response in household portfolios is hard to reject. As is frequently noted in the applied
literature, estimates lose precision when ML is abandoned. This might be an explanation
for the lower t−values we nd for the semiparametric estimates. Moreover, the Honor e
estimator in particular is not ecient, and this will have some bearing on the estimated
standard errors as well. On the other hand, as there is evidence for heteroskedasticity of
unknown form, we prefer to employ the robust methods.
6 Conclusions
We have empirically investigated the question whether income uncertainty matters for
portfolio allocation of households. To this end, we employed a new data source from the
Netherlands, and estimated budget share equations for liquid and riskless nancial asset
in nancial wealth. Emphasis was put on using robust econometric methods. This point is
important since theory gives hardly any guidance as how to evaluate the question at hand
econometrically. In particular, we contrast parametric estimators with semiparametric
methods which avoid the specication of an error distribution, or place less restrictions
on it than ML would. Censoring is taken into account in all specications. In panel data
estimates we allow for xed eects.
parameter restrictions between equations by minimum distance to obtain structural form estimates. This
approach is precluded here, since the latter step involves the choice of an appropriate bandwidth, for
which we have not found a good method, cf. Appendix D.25
As indicator for income uncertainty we relied upon a self{reported measure with cat-
egorical information. Our measure has two main advantages: rst, since households have
more information about their income development than any outside observer, we do not
need to base the evaluation of future earnings risk on the observed earnings history of the
household; this also avoids misspecication of the estimated model, since a continuous
measure of some expected income variance implies again certain restrictions on the equa-
tion of interest (see the criticism in Carroll and Samwick (1995b)). Second, with a 5 year
horizon it is of a considerably longer term than subjective measures employed elsewhere.
We can also assess the dierential eects of using a shorter horizon.
Our ndings from dierent kinds of estimators are somewhat inconclusive. Viewing
the range of predictions for the level of precautionary wealth as reported in the existing
literature (again, see the overview in Carroll and Samwick (1995b)) this is hardly surpris-
ing. If anything, our estimates suggest that income uncertainty may indeed be a source
for precautionary saving and also induces more riskless portfolios. But the eect is not
always clear{cut.
There are several ways of interpreting these ndings. Empirically, the xed eects
model might be capturing temporary components of uncertainty and dierence out per-
manent uncertainty.
From a theoretical perspective, one mightconclude that preferencesdo not meet the re-
quirements of decreasing absolute prudence (we did nd evidence for decreasing relative,
and hence, absolute risk aversion). Note in particular, that standardness is a restric-
tive assumption, compared with other concepts (like risk vulnerability, Gollier and Pratt
(1996)).
Comparing with the ndings from other countries (for the US (Chakraborty and
Kazarosian (1996)) and Italy (Guiso et al. (1996)), one should realize that the Nether-
lands have a quite well organized system of social security provisions and a huge sector
of occupational pensions which would to some extent reduce the need for precautionary
saving, at least for the risk from earnings.
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Appendix A: Measures of Income Risk
Here we list the information provided in the data37.
(a)
[1899.] \Do you think, taking into account possible changes within the household, the total
net income of your household will increase, remain the same, or decrease, in the next 12
months?": :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::1-increase, 2-remain the same, 3-decrease.
conditional upon answers 1 or 3:
(b1)
[1900.] \By what percentage do you think the total net income of your household will
increase in the next 12 months?": :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::in %-age points.
(b3)
[1901.] \By what percentage do you think the total net income of your household will
decrease in the next 12 months?": :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::in %-age points.
(c)
[1902.] \How certain do you feel about this change of income?": :::::::::::::::::::::::
. :::::::::1-very certain, 2-rather certain, 3-not very certain 4-not at all certain.
(d);1 −7
[1903{1909.] Consider a change of your income by xx% next year: how likely do you think
is this?:38 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::1-highly unlikely, . . ., 7-highly likely.
There are seven questions, one each for xx%: < −15%; −15=−10%; −10=−5%; −5=+5%;
+5= + 10%; +10= + 15%; > +15%.
(e)
[1910.] \Do you think the total net income of your household will increase, remain the
same, or decrease, in the next ve years?": :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::1-increase, 2-remain about the same, 3-decrease.
conditional upon answers 1 or 3:
(f1)
37cf. Camphuis and Ketelaars (1995); variable numbers refer to numbers therein; 1993 wave.
38the wording in the questionnaire is dierent, although the content is the same as here.29
[1911.] \By what percentage do you think the total net income of your household will
increase in the next ve years?": ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::in %-age points.
(f3)
[1912.] \By what percentage do you think the total net income of your household will
decrease in the next ve years?": ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::in %-age points.
(g)
[1913.] \How certain do you feel about this change of income?": :::::::::::::::::::::::
. :::::::::1-very certain, 2-rather certain, 3-not very certain 4-not at all certain.
(h)
[1914.] \Do you expect prices in general to rise, to remain the same, or to go down, in
the next 12 months?": :::::::::::::::::::::1-go down, 2-remain the same, 3-rise.
conditional upon answer 3:
(i)
[1915.] \By how many percent do you expect prices to rise in the next 12 months?": :::
. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::in %-age points.
(j)
[1916.] \Do you expect prices in general to rise, to remain the same, or to go down, in
the next ve years?": ::::::::::::::::::::::1-go down, 2-remain the same, 3-rise.
conditional upon answer 3:
(k)
[1917.] \By how many percent do you expect prices to have risen after ve years?": ::::
. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::in %-age points.
The measure `income uncertainty' is a set of two dummy variables (three categories),
directly obtained from variables (c)a n d( g ), for the 1 and 5 year horizon, respectively:
category 1 is the reference group, category 2 is labeled `moderate uncertainty' and cate-
gories 3 and 4 are dubbed `high uncertainty'.
To obtain a measure of income uncertainty which is closer related to a measure of
variance, the following procedure has been suggested by Rob Alessie (source: personal
communication):
Rescale the variables (d) which ask for the likelihood of a given income change such
that the answer categories (1-7) match into the interval (0.05,0.95) and interpret these
answers as probabilities. Then form an expected value by dividing the new variables by
the sum over all 7 questions (ie. the possible given ranges for the income change). From
there, construct the variance for 1{year income uncertainty. A technical problem is the
arbitrary assumption that the answer categories are evenly spaced (ie. the probability
dierence between `likely' and `not so likely' is the same as between `highly unlikely' and
`unlikely').30
Appendix B: Tables and Figures
Figure 1:
Table 1: Risk Aversion and the Demand for Risky Assets
DARA CARA IARA
DRRA >1. / . . / .
CRRA  =1 . / . . / .
IRRA 0 <<1 =0 <0
 : elasticity of the demand
for risky assets wrt initial wealth
./.: inconsistent with expected utility theory
table adapted from Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995), Table 9.1, p. 13431
Table 2: Income Expectation and Income Uncertainty
| heads of households, in % |
a) 1 year horizon, 1993 (nobs. = 1915)
expect %-age of income uncertainty
income to sample low moderate high all
increase 16.40 26.43 57.64 15.92 100.00
same 70.18 24.40 66.29 9.30 100.00
decrease 13.42 26.85 49.42 23.74 100.00
all 100.00 25.07 62.61 12.32 100.00
Pearson 2
4 =5 2 : 52; p−value = 0:0%
b) 5 year horizon, 1993 (nobs. = 1915)
expect %-age of income uncertainty
income to sample low moderate high all
increase 35.40 9.73 64.90 25.37 100.00
same 46.06 12.59 69.16 18.25 100.00
decrease 18.54 15.21 55.21 29.58 100.00
all 100.00 12.06 65.07 22.87 100.00
Pearson 2
4 =3 0 : 79; p−value = 0:0%
c) 1 year against 5 year horizon, 1993 (nobs. = 1915)
1 year/5 yrs low moderate high total
low 8.88 14.36 1.83 25.07
moderate 3.08 46.89 12.64 62.61
high 0.10 3.81 8.41 12.32
all 12.06 65.07 22.87 100.00
Pearson 2
4 = 623:79; p−value = 0:0%
d1) 5 year horizon, 1993 against 1994 (nobs. = 1486)
1993 /1994 low moderate high total
low 4.98 5.99 0.54 11.51
moderate 6.80 46.57 12.38 65.75
high 0.74 10.36 11.64 22.75
all 12.52 62.92 24.56 100.00
Pearson 2
4 = 323:33; p−value = 0:0%
d2) 5 year horizon, 1994 against 1995 (nobs. = 1258)
1994 /1995 low moderate high total
low 6.04 6.60 1.19 13.83
moderate 7.00 45.87 8.98 61.84
high 0.79 13.04 10.49 24.32
all 13.83 65.50 20.67 100.00
Pearson 2
4 = 265:46; p−value = 0:0%
d3) 5 year horizon, 1993 against 1995 (nobs. = 1042)
1993 /1995 low moderate high total
low 4.99 5.85 0.67 11.52
moderate 6.81 48.37 10.84 66.03
high 1.34 11.90 9.21 22.46
all 13.15 66.12 20.73 100.00
Pearson 2
4 = 177:62; p−value = 0:0%32
Table 3: background variables, share of riskless assets, and income uncertainty
| heads of households, in %, 1993 |
%o f share of riskless assets income uncertainty
Nobs = 1915 sample mean pc10a pc20 pc30 pc40 low moderate high
age class
under 25 2.6 .90 .63 .87 1 1 12.0 50.0 38.0
25{39 34.3 .74 .14 .40 .63 .78 8.7 65.2 26.1
40{54 36.8 .64 .08 .23 .38 .53 11.5 65.6 22.9
55{64 14.2 .67 .09 .24 .45 .58 18.8 68.8 12.5
65+ 12.2 .74 .09 .33 .64 .85 15.5 61.8 22.7
Pearson 2
8 =4 2 : 13; p−value = 0:0%
education level
primary education 5.4 .81 .19 .55 .82 1 9.7 65.0 25.2
secondary educ. 9.9 .76 .12 .33 .73 .94 7.9 68.4 23.7
pre{university 12.5 .69 .11 .24 .47 .66 13.0 64.9 22.2
junior vocational 11.3 .75 .09 .39 .65 .97 7.9 61.6 30.6
senior vocational 10.4 .68 .10 .26 .47 .68 12.6 67.8 19.6
vocat. college 29.7 .70 .13 .32 .52 .71 14.4 66.2 19.4
university 20.9 .62 .06 .21 .36 .53 12.8 62.5 24.8
Pearson 2
12 =2 1 : 39; p−value = 4:5%
employment status
self{employed 9.9 .68 .03 .18 .41 .68 11.6 63.5 24.9
unemployed 1.7 .91 .52 .96 1 1 3.1 62.5 34.4
the rest 88.5 .70 .11 .29 .50 .69 12.3 65.3 22.4
Pearson 2
4 =4 : 65; p−value = 32:5%
panel
representative 61.5 .77 .14 .46 .69 .92 11.4 63.1 25.5
high income 38.5 .58 .07 .19 .30 .47 13.1 68.2 18.7
Pearson 2
2 =1 2 : 07; p−value = 0:2%
nancial wealth
1st quintile 20.0 . 9 1 . 6 8111 10.7 59.3 30.0
2nd quintile 20.0 .81 .33 .54 .75 .94 11.7 64.8 23.5
3rd quintile 20.0 .76 .23 .48 .65 .82 10.4 67.1 22.5
4th quintile 20.0 .60 .09 .25 .35 .50 11.7 66.6 21.7
5th quintile 20.0 .41 .02 .07 .13 .21 15.7 67.6 16.7
Pearson 2
8 =2 3 : 61; p−value = 0:3%
income uncertainty
low 12.1 .65 .07 .23 .38 .55
moderate 65.1 .69 .10 .28 .50 .68
high 22.9 .75 .15 .40 .64 .82
Total 100.0 .70 .11 .29 .50 .70 12.1 65.1 22.9
Note: gures for 1994 and 1995 available upon request
a pc10 (etc.) means: 10th (etc.) percentile33
Table 4: Parametric Estimates
| Baseline Specication, 1993 |
explained: share of riskless in nancial wealth
homoskedastic heteroskedastic Bivariate Double Hurdle
Tobit Tobit Tobit equation particip. eqn.
coe. t-value coe. t-value coe. t-value coe. t-value
constant 3.4907 (6.939) 6.9555 (4.46) 1.6586 (2.805) {3.5645 ({1.645)
age {0.0900 ({3.154) {0.0159 ({0.459) {0.1088 ({3.116) 0.1453 (1.091)
age2/100 0.1780 (3.012) 0.0044 (0.061) 0.2150 (2.980) {0.3437 ({1.257)
age3/1000 {0.0107 ({2.761) 0.0021 (0.425) {0.0132 ({2.809) 0.0242 (1.367)
secondary educ. {0.0254 ({0.366) {0.0375 ({0.490) {0.0829 ({1.030) - 0.0158 ({0.053)
pre{university {0.0967 ({1.454) {0.1135 ({1.531) {0.1171 ({1.474) 0.1293 (0.437)
junior vocat. {0.0930 ({1.359) {0.0769 ({0.998) {0.1440 ({1.766) 0.1799 (0.624)
senior vocat. {0.1806 ({2.653) {0.1715 ({2.237) {0.1746 ({2.200) 0.4488 (1.485)
vocat. college {0.0437 ({0.708) {0.0434 ({0.615) {0.0570 ({0.766) 0.1943 (0.697)
university {0.0763 ({1.195) {0.0599 ({0.832) {0.0886 ({1.145) 0.2946 (0.959)
diploma 0.0662 (2.009) 0.0789 (2.277) 0.0671 (1.898) {0.0487 ({0.363)
log n. wealth 1 {0.1049 ({3.263) {0.6227 ({3.507) 0.1176 (3.469) 0.1686 (2.027)
log n. wealth 2 {0.1935 ({3.892) {0.2676 ({3.121) {0.0728 ({1.254) 0.2978 (1.615)
log n. wealth 3 {0.1789 ({3.117) {0.2143 ({3.512) {0.1266 ({1.968) 0.3595 (1.377)
log n. wealth 4 {0.2612 ({5.365) {0.2330 ({5.199) {0.2180 ({3.988) 0.8780 (3.012)
log n. wealth 5 {0.1397 ({4.217) {0.1581 ({4.871) {0.1287 ({3.166) {0.0656 ({0.287)
self{employed 0.0237 (0.542) 0.0484 (0.969) {0.0219 ({0.491) {0.1393 ({0.802)
no paid job 0.0878 (1.095) 0.0514 (0.671) {0.0066 ({0.071) {0.1647 ({0.511)
other job 0.0435 (0.571) 0.0554 (0.686) {0.0120 ({0.146) {0.1751 ({0.500)
retired / disabled {0.0290 ({0.604) {0.0429 ({0.939) {0.0453 ({0.838) {0.0062 {0.028)
unemployed 0.3275 (2.638) 0.2257 (2.006) 0.1995 (0.800) {0.6765 ({0.882)
married or cohab. {0.0686 ({2.037) {0.0570 ({1.627) {0.0079 ({0.214) 0.2321 (1.687)
panel (1=HIP) {0.0842 ({2.801) {0.1003 ({3.423) {0.0598 ({1.771) 0.3857 (2.444)
high income unc. 0.0869 (2.010) 0.0877 (2.037) 0.0896 (1.820) {0.1991 ({1.010)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0514 (1.388) 0.0618 (1.680) 0.0633 (1.507) {0.0895 ({0.512)
nanc. int.: 5 | (|) 0.5170 (3.151)
nanc. int.: 6 | (|) 0.6384 (2.869)
nanc. int.: 7 | (|) 0.5049 (2.093)
nobs 1915 1915 1915
left cens. at 0 43 43 43
right cens. at 1 823 823 823
Log Lhd. {1242.2 {1159.8 {1034.9
Wald test 4.060 (2 df) 4.230 (2 df) 3.394 (2df) 1.169 (2df)
Wald test 6.920 (4df)
Pseudo R2 0.2288 0.2800 0.3604
Denition of variables: highest level of education: lowest education (primary/elementary or special low
level education; reference cat.); secondary educ.: continued special (low level) education, secondary educ.;
pre{university; junior vocat.: junior vocational education and apprenticeships; senior vocat.: senior voca-
tional training; vocat. college: vocational colleges; university; diploma: received degree; log n. wealth:
linear spline with 4 knots at the quintiles of the distribution of log(n. wealth+1); self{employed through
unemployed: reference cat.: paid job. uncertainty: cf. text and Appendix A. risk attitude: prepared to
take risks, 7{pt scale (cf. text); nanc. int.: interested in nancial matters, 7{pt scale (cf. text).
 under the heteroskedasticity specication i = cexp(ziγ); estimates of ^ c and ^ γ suppressed in table and
available upon request.  estimates of ^  and ^  suppressed in table and available upon request.34
Table 5a: Censored Regression Quantiles
| Baseline Specication, 1993 |
explained: share of riskless in nancial wealth
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
coe. t-value coe. t-value coe. t-value coe. t-value
constant 2.6944 (3.185) 2.9966 (1.492) 6.6485 (0.081) 3.3911 (0.356)
age {0.0643 ({1.458) {0.0756 ({1.995) {0.1372 ({2.213) {0.1381 ({1.867)
age2/100 0.1331 (1.424) 0.1436 (1.823) 0.2527 (1.968) 0.2536 (1.600)
age3/1000 {0.0084 ({1.326) {0.0081 ({1.535) {0.0142 ({1.654) {0.0141 ({0.657)
secondary educ. {0.1687 ({1.798) {0.0962 ({1.037) {0.0877 ({0.760) {0.0307 ({0.216)
pre{university {0.1637 ({1.802) {0.1045 ({1.314) {0.1467 ({1.369) {0.0880 ({0.776)
junior vocat. {0.2344 ({2.359) {0.1552 ({1.724) {0.1575 ({1.404) {0.0731 ({0.583)
senior vocat. {0.2474 ({2.550) {0.1679 ({2.015) {0.1814 ({1.825) {0.1425 ({1.175)
vocat. college {0.1055 ({1.208) {0.0408 ({0.562) {0.0512 ({0.550) 0.0137 (0.117)
university {0.1172 ({1.329) {0.0564 ({0.766) {0.0434 ({0.478) 0.0194 (0.167)
diploma 0.0447 (1.148) 0.0461 (0.985) 0.0491 (0.897) 0.0859 (1.755)
log n. wealth 1 {0.1396 ({1.860) {0.1180 ({0.545) {0.4129 ({0.042) {0.0035 ({0.003)
log n. wealth 2 {0.1548 ({1.463) {0.2813 ({3.076) {0.1594 ({1.212) {0.2669 ({2.434)
log n. wealth 3 {0.1405 ({1.660) {0.1130 ({1.280) {0.1979 ({2.064) {0.2175 ({2.034)
log n. wealth 4 {0.1176 ({2.019) {0.2033 ({3.441) {0.2625 ({5.008) {0.3098 ({4.475)
log n. wealth 5 {0.0505 ({2.083) {0.0904 ({3.446) {0.1072 ({3.885) {0.1416 ({4.581)
self{employed {0.1038 ({1.999) {0.0281 ({0.420) {0.0098 ({0.171) 0.0187 (0.391)
no paid job 0.0749 (0.798) 0.0111 (0.118) {0.0061 ({0.053) {0.0577 ({0.394)
other job {0.0150 ({0.164) {0.0078 ({0.075) 0.0071 (0.051) {0.0214 ({0.119)
retired / disabled {0.0532 ({0.933) {0.0370 ({0.692) {0.0735 ({1.366) {0.0642 ({0.907)
unemployed 0.2495 (1.522) 0.2254 (1.362) 0.1966 (1.165) 0.2437 (1.426)
married or cohab. {0.0341 ({0.999) {0.0011 ({0.022) 0.0202 (0.392) 0.0078 (0.127)
panel (1=HIP) 0.0076 (0.272) {0.0350 ({1.126) {0.0664 ({1.647) {0.0760 ({1.657)
high income unc. 0.0621 (1.415) 0.1008 (1.986) 0.0870 (1.616) 0.0686 (1.111)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0469 (1.405) 0.0295 (0.672) 0.0584 (1.333) 0.0756 (1.426)
Nobs = 1915
function 109.057 168.876 198.486 206.882
Pseudo-R2 0.1399 0.2443 0.2943 0.3101
Wald, 2 df 2.412 4.062 2.690 2.078
Note: Covariance matrix estimated by design matrix bootstrap estimator with 250 bootstrap iterations.
t−values in parentheses; the Wald test statistics refer to joint signicance tests of parameters for income
uncertainty.35
Table 5b: Censored Regression Quantiles
| Sensitivity Analysis, 1993 |
explained: share of riskless in nancial wealth
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
coe. t-value coe. t-value coe. t-value coe. t-value
a) baseline specication, cf. table 5a | Nobs = 1915
high income unc. 0.0621 (1.415) 0.1008 (1.986) 0.0870 (1.616) 0.0686 (1.111)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0469 (1.405) 0.0295 (0.672) 0.0584 (1.333) 0.0756 (1.426)
Pseudo-R2 0.1399 0.2443 0.2943 0.3101
Wald, 2 df 2.412 4.062 2.690 2.078
b) 1 year horizon | Nobs = 1915
high income unc. 0.0662 (0.808) 0.1429 (2.654) 0.1446 (2.382) 0.0338 (0.554)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0190 (0.678) -0.0006 (-0.017) 0.0348 (0.971) 0.0158 (0.399)
Pseudo-R2 0.1397 0.2470 0.2961 0.3095
Wald, 2 df 0.958 8.879 5.673 0.314
c) continuous measure of income variance | Nobs = 1765
income variance 0.0010 (1.579) 0.0015 (1.909) 0.0007 (1.252) 0.0003 (0.475)
Pseudo-R2 0.1481 0.2450 0.2918 0.3074
d) precautionary motives, broad specication | Nobs = 1874
prec. motive -0.0010 (-0.052) 0.0334 (1.920) 0.0447 (2.230) 0.0407 (2.011)
Pseudo-R2 0.1489 0.2565 0.3048 0.3184
e) precautionary motives, narrow specication | Nobs = 1915
prec. motive -0.0004 (-0.012) 0.0434 (1.428) 0.0414 (1.346) 0.0654 (1.851)
Pseudo-R2 0.1385 0.2423 0.2935 0.3115
f) with interaction income expectation | Nobs = 1895
high income unc. 0.0624 (1.244) 0.1196 (2.255) 0.0772 (1.416) 0.0793 (1.274)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0434 (1.252) 0.0416 (0.922) 0.0400 (0.860) 0.0731 (1.338)
income expect. 0.0004 (0.449) 0.0002 (0.130) -0.0003 (-0.128) -0.0006 (-0.175)
hi unc  expect. -0.0005 (-0.236) -0.0025 (-1.243) -0.0024 (-0.912) -0.0021 (-0.489)
mod unc  expect. 0.0006 (0.349) 0.0020 (1.068) 0.0019 (0.767) 0.0000 (0.001)
Pseudo-R2 0.1411 0.2466 0.2964 0.3113
Wald, 2 df 1.987 6.541 2.043 1.975
Wald, 2 df (interact) 0.205 4.755 4.206 0.519
g) interaction with log nancial wealth | Nobs = 1915
high income unc. 0.5242 (1.270) 0.1398 (0.404) 0.1898 (0.489) {0.2088 (?)
moder. inc. unc. 0.1311 (0.402) {0.1192 ({0.322) 0.2985 (0.761) 0.5575 (?)
hi unct  log wealth {0.0417 ({1.155) {0.0028 ({0.091) {0.0099 ({0.000) 0.0274 (?)
mod unct  log wealth {0.0076 ({0.271) 0.0144 (0.445) {0.0213 ({0.000) {0.0438 (?)
Pseudo-R2 0.1424 0.2449 0.2943
Wald, 2 df 1.685 0.836 0.597
Wald, 2 df (interact) 1.453 0.501 0.106
continued on next page36
Table 5b: continued
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
coe. t-value coe. t-value coe. t-value coe. t-value
h) exclusion of log nancial wealth | Nobs = 1915
high income unc. 0.0331 (0.566) 0.1182 (1.719) 0.0960 (1.317) 0.1185 (1.445)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0073 (0.187) 0.0537 (0.934) 0.0179 (0.334) {0.0025 (-0.041)
Pseudo-R2 0.0334 0.0777 0.1101 0.1380
Wald, 2 df 0.381 3.075 2.036 2.980
i) prediction of median log nancial wealth | Nobs = 1915
high income unc. 0.0625 (1.283) 0.1030 (1.741) 0.1027 (1.271) 0.1159 (1.476)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0441 (1.186) 0.0699 (1.425) 0.0578 (1.180) 0.0234 (0.382)
Pseudo-R2 0.0402 0.1001 0.1426 0.1786
Wald, 2 df 1.969 3.088 1.890 2.922
j) with pension entitlement | Nobs = 1915
high income unc. 0.0410 (0.723) 0.1056 (2.011) 0.0830 (1.560) 0.0748 (1.263)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0320 (0.795) 0.0273 (0.677) 0.0591 (1.359) 0.0761 (1.396)
pension entitlem. -0.0319 (-0.519) -0.0502 (-0.843) -0.0486 (-0.787) -0.0531 (-0.733)
Pseudo-R2 0.1384 0.2448 0.2939 0.3104
Wald, 2 df 0.693 4.182 2.577 2.093
k) with bequest motive | Nobs = 1878
high income unc. 0.0669 (1.450) 0.1013 (2.098) 0.0838 (1.712) 0.0346 (0.525)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0511 (1.391) 0.0302 (0.717) 0.0633 (1.463) 0.0367 (0.616)
bequest motive -0.0142 (-0.414) 0.0067 (0.149) 0.0424 (0.935) 0.0216 (0.570)
Pseudo-R2 0.1359 0.2434 0.2945 0.3125
Wald, 2 df 2.699 4.664 3.200 0.386
l) with price expectation | Nobs = 1874
high income unc. 0.0671 (1.275) 0.1043 (1.980) 0.0544 (0.829) 0.0382 (0.526)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0489 (1.224) 0.0408 (1.021) 0.0458 (0.908) 0.0492 (0.860)
price expectation 0.0023 (1.067) 0.0008 (0.379) 0.0002 (0.084) -0.0012 (-0.490)
Pseudo-R2 0.1467 0.2491 0.2983 0.3159
Wald, 2 df 2.031 3.924 0.871 0.777
Note: t−values in parentheses; the Wald test statistics refer to joint signicance tests of parameters of
interest | usually income uncertainty or precautionary motives, or interaction terms with other variables;
covariance matrix: design boostrap estimator, 250 replications; ? = calculation failed3
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Table 6a: Honor e Fixed Eects Estimator
explained: share of riskless in nancial wealth
1993/1994 1993/1995 1994/1995 1993{1995
coe. t{value coe. t{value coe. t{value coe. t{value
log n. wealth 1 {0.0958 ({1.675) {0.1082 ({1.596) {0.1782 ({4.295) {0.1479 ({2.181)
log n. wealth 2 {0.2463 ({3.067) {0.1588 ({1.692) {0.0994 ({1.507) {0.1376 ({1.304)
log n. wealth 3 {0.0505 ({0.668) {0.0836 ({0.961) {0.1949 ({2.774) {0.1164 ({1.090)
log n. wealth 4 {0.1980 ({3.275) {0.2637 ({4.431) {0.1962 ({3.300) {0.2247 ({2.720)
log n. wealth 5 {0.0905 ({1.786) {0.1381 ({3.336) {0.1634 ({4.103) {0.1437 ({2.364)
high income unc. 0.0346 (0.955) 0.0505 (1.091) 0.0450 (1.135) 0.0370 (0.724)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0476 (1.633) 0.0853 (2.398) 0.0081 (0.262) 0.0412 (1.027)
Wald, 2 df 2.823 6.550 1.935 1.056
Nobs (households) 1486 1041 1259 1840
right cens. (%) 41.0 34.7 36.8
function 104.278 100.195 107.926
test for symmetry 79.78 (6df)
Note: the Wald test statistics refer to joint signicance tests of parameters for income uncertainty;
the corresponding 2 value is: 2
2(95%) = 5:99138
Table 6b: Honor e Fixed Eects Estimator
| Sensitivity Analysis, 1993{1995 |
explained: share of riskless in nancial wealth
a) baseline spec., cf. table 6a | NH = 1840 g) with interact. log nan. wealth | NH = 1840
high income unc. 0.0370 (0.724) high income unc. -0.2913 (-0.650)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0412 (1.027) moder. inc. unc. -0.0961 (-0.254)
Wald, 2 df 1.056 hi unct  log wealth 0.0308 (0.768)
mod unct  log wealth 0.0122 (0.369)
b)1y e a rh o r i z o n|N H = 1840 Wald, 2 df 0.583
high income unc. -0.0022 (-0.038) Wald, 2 df (interact) 0.703
moder. inc. unc. 0.0065 (0.195)
Wald, 2 df 0.064 h) exclusion of log nan. wealth | NH = 1840
high income unc. 0.0351 (0.581)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0329 (0.688)
Wald, 2 df 0.485
c) cont. measure of income variance, NH = 1665 j) with pension entitlement | NH = 1841
income variance -0.0008 (-1.261) high income unc. 0.0386 (0.759)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0418 (1.042)
d)? precautionary motives, broad | NH = 1003 pension entitlem. -0.0305 (-0.364)
prec. motive -0.0348 (-1.962) Wald, 2 df 1.086
e)? precautionary motives, narrow | NH = 1040 k)? with bequest motive | NH = 1040
prec. motive -0.0590 (-2.116) high income unc. 0.0501 (1.100)
moder. inc. unc. 0.0855 (2.404)
f) with interact. inc. expect. | NH = 1665 bequest motive 0.0307 (0.838)
high income unc. 0.0403 (0.747) Wald, 2 df 6.544
moder. inc. unc. 0.0391 (0.923)
income expect. -0.0003 (-0.038) l)? with price expectation | NH = 1796
hi unc  expect. -0.0032 (-0.308) high income unc. 0.0317 (0.617)
mod unc  expect. -0.0004 (-0.054) moder. inc. unc. 0.0367 (0.931)
Wald, 2 df 0.865 price expectation 0.0012 (0.531)
Wald, 2 df (interact) 0.134 Wald, 2 df 0.870
Note: NH = number of observations per household; t−values in parentheses; the Wald test statistics
refer to joint signicance tests of parameters of interest | usually income uncertainty or precautionary
motives, or interaction terms with other variables; estimates displayed are based on unbalanced panel data
for 1993{1995, Minimum Distance estimates; estimates marked with ? are two{wave Honor ee s t i m a t e s
based on the years 1993 and 1995.39
Appendix C: Optimization Algorithms for Censored
Regression Quantiles
This Appendix gives a short account of optimization for censored regression quantiles,
including censored least absolute deviations (CLAD).
To begin with, consider the (uncensored) model
yi = xi + i (10)
for which the conditional quantile restriction
Q(ijxi) = 0 (11)
holds. Koenker and Bassett (1978) introduce the estimator




(yi − xi); (z)=( −1[z<0])z: (12)
Now, note that any least absolute deviation (LAD) problem (without censoring) has
a representation as a linear program (LP; see for instance Bloomeld and Steiger (1983)).
Then, (12) represents the primal problem of the LP. A global optimum exists if the matrix
x has full column rank. It can be found by a pivoting algorithm which searches over a set
of basic feasible solutions of a system of constraints (e.g. Barrodale and Roberts (1973)).
This method generalizes to other quantiles as well since the minimand for a quantile
regression problem is inherently linear and convex in : Dene ui =m a x f  i ; 0 gand
vi = −minfi;0g where i = yi −xi.L e tb j=m a x f  j;0 gand cj = −minfj;0g.T h u s ,








xij(bj − cj)+u i−v i
and bj;c j;u i;v i 0 8i=1 ;:::;N;j=1 ;:::;k
The equivalence of quantile regression and LP is destroyed as soon as censoring is taken
into account. The model, as considered in Powell (1986a), species a linear relationship
between the latent variable y and regressors x
y

i = xi + i (13)







i >y c i
Again, the conditional quantile restriction Q(ijxi)=0i si m p o s e d .
The censored quantile regression problem
^ Bn()=a r gm i n
 Q n(  )=
n X
i =1
(yi − minfyci;x i g) (14)40
is not linear, due to the censoring (in our application at yci = 1 from above). Moreover,
the function is non{convex and the solution ^ Bn() need not be unique.
Fitzenberger (1994) develops an algorithm based on Barrodale{Roberts for censored




(ui +( 1−) v i)










and bj;c j;u i;v i 0 8i=1 ;:::;N;j=1 ;:::;k
where ui;v i;b j and cj are as above, but the argument i of ui and vi is now i = yi −
minfxi;yc ig.
brcens will not necessarily nd a global minimum due to the non{convexity of (14).
However, with brcens we found the smallest function value in the application, compared
to the results from various alternative algorithms.
Viable alternatives to brcens which are designed to solve (14) are Womersley (1986),
and Koenker and Park's (1996) nlrq. The latter proved inferior to brcens in the applica-
tion. In addition Buchinsky (1994) proposed the following short{cut: it solves (12) for ~ 
(j)

in iteration j using those observations for which in the previous iteration xi~ 
(j−1)
 <y c i.
When in two consecutive iterations the set of observations are the same, the algorithm
terminates using ~ 
(j)
 as minimzer of (14). This method is dubbed \iterative linear pro-
gramming algorithm (ilpa)". We found diculties with ilpa since it cycled in the sense
that after a nite xed number of iterations J, the sequence of observations used repeat-
ed itself. Fitzenberger (1994) shows that ilpa is based on theoretically untenable claims.
This can lead not only to non{convergence but even conditional upon convergence does
not guarantee a local minimum. Nevertheless it seems to work reasonably in practice
as Fitzenberger's simulation exercises demonstrate. Our experience in the application
conrms this only for the lower quantiles, where cycling was less serious.
Note, that many numerical minimizers which do not take the specic structure of (14)
into account, will have trouble to nd a global minimum of the objective function. This
is because the objective function has many local minima due to the high dimension of the
parameter space and the high degree of censoring. Gradient based methods, for instance,
which are strictly speaking not applicable since (14) is not dierentiable everywhere get
easily trapped in local minima.
Powell (1984, 1986a) recommends M. J. D. Powell's directions set method and the
downhill simplex method of Nelder and Mead (see Press et al. (1989) for reference and
implementation) for low{dimensional problems. In our application we had diculties in
obtaining estimates with these algorithms.
From our experience emerges that LP based methods seem to be the only feasible,
theoretically appealing, and computationally ecient ways to compute the estimates.
Fitzenberger (1997) provides a neat presentation and thorough discussion of censored
regression quantiles and available algorithms.41
Appendix D: Covariance Matrix Estimation for Cen-
sored Regression Quantiles
Powell's (1984, 1986a) formulae for an estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix d-
ier according to whether the errors are i.i.d. or heteroskedastic, and involve the choice
of a bandwidth parameter for a non{parametric estimate of the (conditional) error den-
sity. We experienced a rather high sensitivity of the covariance matrix estimate to the
choice of this smoothing parameter. Hall and Horowitz (1990) propose a data{dependent,
semi{automatic method for choosing both smoother (kernel) and bandwidth which are
optimal in some sense. Their formulae involve in a rst stage non{parametric estimates
of rst and second derivatives of a density function, based on two dierent bandwidth
parameters. In a second stage this allows to estimate the bandwidth of interest. The
Hall and Horowitz method is derived for the homoskedastic case, whereas our data are
heteroskedastic. Therefore, Powell's estimator does not appear to be a wise choice to
estimate the covariance matrix.
Alternatively, Buchinsky (1994) suggests to use the order statistics estimator of the
covariance matrix, as developed by Huber (1981). The errors in the original model are
assumed to be conditionally independent of the regressors; otherwise, the order statistics
estimator will be inconsistent.
Finally, one can use bootstrap methods. The design matrix bootstrap estimator sur-
vives under heteroskedasticity and censoring as a consistent estimator. It is based on
re{sampling observations with replacement. Hahn (1995) provides theoretical justica-
tion for using the bootstrap for Powell's (1986a) estimator. Buchinsky (1994, 1996),
Chamberlain (1994), and Fitzenberger (1994, 1997) provide empirical and Monte Carlo
evidence in favor of the bootstrap under heteroskedasticity.
The number of bootstrap samples drawn, B, is a `smoothing parameter' to be chosen
by the investigator. However, the estimate will become more accurate as B !1 ,w h e r e -
as the selected bandwidth for Powell's estimator may be either too large or too small.
Andrews and Buchinsky (1996) devise a semi{automatic procedure for the choice of B for
estimating standard errors. This choice depends in particular on the accuracy one wishes
to obtain for the estimates (as measured by the relative deviation of the bootstrapped
standard error estimate from the asymptotic value) and on the degree of excess kurtosis
of the bootstrapped distribution of the parameter under consideration. With the An-
drews and Buchinsky (1996) instructions for an accuracy parameter of 10% we found that
for most of the parameters the number of required bootstrap estimates was well below
250 | including the parameters of particular interest. Some further experiments showed
that increasing B to 500 or 1000 did not lead to dierent conclusions, at the expense of
substantially longer calculation times.
We ignore the subtle point of asymptotic renements of the bootstrap estimator to
the empirical levels of asymptotically pivotal test statistics, as considered by Horowitz
(1997). The reason is again that the bootstrapped distribution of, say, t− or 2− statis-
tics is based on some consistent estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix in the
rst place. Horowitz develops a smoothed version of Powell's (1984) CLAD, \SCLAD",
and documents that both slope coecients and covariance matrix estimate are rather
insensitive to the choice of bandwidth, hence allowing for bootstrapping t− and 2−
statistics.